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Summary
This paper has two purposes. The ﬁrst is to describe the existing theory of
long-run behavior of populations playing a normal-form game. In this paper the
emphasis is on symmetric 2× 2 games which is the most analytical convienent.
The methods here relies on that agents are not fully rational, they can make
mistakes when playing. The reason for this possible mistakes or perturbations
are not speciﬁed but it can be random experementation or just ignorance. When
studying these processes the theory of Markov chains becomes useful. When
assuming that there is one population playing, the dynamics of the distribution
of strategies is a one-dimensional Markov chain. By using standard theory or
the Markov chain tree theorem we can deduce a limiting distribution for the
process(we let time go towards inﬁnity). This limiting distribution will be a
function of the perturbations mentioned earlier. Then, if we let the pertubations
tend to zero, it will often be the case that the probability of the process being in
a speciﬁc state is much higher than for all the other states. This idea leads to the
concept of stochastic stability which was introduced be Foster and Young,1993.
This concept gives a prediction of how the behavior of the population will be
in the long-run i.e which strategies of the game they are most likely to play.
In 2 × 2 games there is a link between the risk dominant equlibrium and the
stochastically stable state and this is used to verify the results when examples
of the use of the theory is presented.
The second purpose of this paper is to extend the existing theory. The
extension here is that we let two populations play against each other in the
game. We assume that one population operates the rows and the other the
columns. This calls for a diﬀerent theoretical approach but still the theory of
Markov chains is important. The best-response dynamics is aﬀected by the
distribution of strategies in the other population. When we let the time horizon
tend to inﬁnity we can again compare the probabilities of being in the diﬀerent
states as the perturbations go to zero. The stochastically stable state, which
will be pairs of distributions in the two populations, shows which strategy both
populations will play in the long-run. This state corresponds to the predicton
we got in the one population case.
The approach here is totally theoretical. The methods used is game theory,
mathematics and statistics. When new concepts or theorems needed to ﬁnd the
stochastically stable states are presented there are examples to show how these
easily can be used. The reason for this is that it should be simple to use the
theory in this paper in other economic applications.
The paper is written in LATEX.
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1 Introduction
In economics the strategic behavior of individuals has since the 1950's been of
upmost interrest among the students within the ﬁeld. The work of John Nash
is in this respect one of the most important contributions, and gave matemath-
icians and economists the analytical tool to matemathically explain diﬀerent
strategic settings within an economy. Nash's theory can also be used to explain
previous works on especially duopoly, like the Bertrand- and Cournot solutions
from the 17th century. This paper will present a theory of stochastic adap-
tive dynamics, which relies on game theory but also elements from stochastic
modelling. This theory stems from the pioneering work of Kandori, Mailath,
Rob(1993 [11]) and Young(1993 [3]). The core of this theory is that one inves-
tigate the strategic behavior of large number of agents playing a normal-form
game. An important feature is that the agents are assumed to not be fully ratio-
nal, as in much of the other existing game theory used in economics. They can
make mistakes when playing the game. This possibility of a "trembling hand"
causes the long-run behavior of the system to be substantially diﬀerent from a
deterministic process.
The stochastic shocks,or perturbations, may be of diﬀerent types, ﬁrst the
way that agents interact may be stochastic when agents are randomly paired up
to play the game, second the agents can be using mixed strategies when playing
the game and third the agent may observe the distribution of the population
and change his type since this is a best response. All these things can be reasons
for the stochastic element in the decitionmaking, but there can also be other
sources.
This theory diﬀers from the theory of evolutionary stable equilibria in games,
where a small mutant group can invade the population and may cause the behav-
ior of the agents to change. But in the evolutionary framework the disturbance
to the process is an isolated event, which clearly can not be a realistic assump-
tion when studying economic systems where shocks constantly hits the system.
When working with this kind of processes one have to combine game theory and
the theory of Markov chains, that is, when time is assumed to be discrete. In
continuous time the stochastics are often assumed to follow a Browninan motion.
In this paper we will limit ourself to discussing dicrete time. When modelling
the behavior i.e the evolution of the strategies or types in the population, as
a Markov chain one can predict what happens to the system in the long-run.
This leads to the idea of stochastic stability(Foster and Young,1990 [1]).
The rest of the paper is compiled in the following way, chapter 2 presents the
standard game theory needed, chapter 3 presents the theory of Markov chains,
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chapter 4 will introduce the concept stochastic adaptive dynamics, chapter 5
gives a possible extension to the theory, chapter 6 is a discussion of the assump-
tions underlying the theory and chapter 7 concludes.
2 Game Theory
2.1 Introduction
Game thory provides a systematic way to study strategic interaction between
agents. This is useful when trying to model how economic agents behave in
diﬀerent situations. This chapter will brieﬂy go through the needed concepts
for the later discussion of stochastic adaptive dynamics. The chapter starts
with some useful deﬁnitions, and then discusses 2× 2 games that will be widely
used later because of its analytic convinience. Lastly the standard theory of
evolutionary stable strategies(ESS) are presented so the diﬀerences between
these and stochastically stable states(SSS) can be pointed out later.
2.2 Deﬁnitions
Deﬁnition 1 A strategy is a complete contigent plan for a player in a game.
Given a game G, let Si denote the strategy space of player i. Let si denote a sin-
gle strategy. A strategy proﬁle s = (s1, s2, .., sn) shows all individual strategies.
S is the set of all strategy proﬁles, where S = S1 × S2 × · · · × Sn1.
Deﬁnition 2 Let ui : S → R be deﬁned as a payoﬀ function. ui(s1, s2, ...sn) is
the payoﬀ to player i when the strategy proﬁle is s = (s1, s2, .., sn)
Deﬁnition 3 A belief of player i is a probability distribution, denoted µ−i ∈
∆S−i over the strategies of the other players. ∆S−i is the set of probability
distributions over the strategies of all players except player i. The belief of
player i about the behavior of player j is µj ∈ ∆Sj,where ∆Sj is the set of
all probability distributions for player j, such that for each sj ∈ Sj of player j,
µj(sj) is the probability that player i thinks player j will play sj.
Properties:
µj(sj) ≥ 0 sj ∈ Sj (1)∑
sj∈Sj
µj(sj) = 1 (2)
1S is the cartesian product of the players individual strategy space Si, i = 0, .., n.
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A mixed strategy is the act of selecting a strategy according to the above prob-
ability distribution. In other words the players choose the probability that they
will play the diﬀerent strategies. Extending the deﬁnition of a payoﬀ function
to mixed strategies and beliefs can be done by using the concept expected value.
When player i has beliefs µ−i about the actions of others and therefore plan to
use strategy si, then the expected value is:
ui(si, µ−i) =
∑
s−i∈S−i
µ−i(si)ui(si, s−i) (3)
Assume that a rational agent wish to maxmize the payoﬀ that the agent expect
to recieve. The agent should then select the strategy that yields the greatest
expected payoﬀ against his or her beliefs.
Deﬁnition 4 Suppose player i have belief µ−i ∈ ∆S−i about the strategies
played by other players. Player i's strategy si ∈ Si is a best response if:
ui(si, µ−i) ≥ ui(s′i, µ−i) ∀isi ∈ Si (4)
Deﬁnition 5 The formal deﬁnition of weak and strong dominance is the fol-
lowing. A pure strategy si of player i is dominated if there is a pure or mixed
strategy denoted ςi, where ςi ∈ ∆Si such that;
ui(ςi, s−i) ≥ ui(si, s−i) (5)
for all strategy proﬁles s−i ∈ S−i of the other players.
The strategy is weakly or strongly dominated when the inequality is weak or
strict respectively.
Deﬁnition 6 A strategy proﬁle is a Nash equilibrium if and only if each player's
prescribed strategy is a best response against the strategies of others.
Formally a strategy proﬁle si ∈ S is a Nash equilibrium if and only if,
ui(si, s−i) ≥ ui(s′i, s−i) (6)
for each s′i ∈ Si and each player i.
Deﬁnition 7 A mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium is an equilibrium where the
players use a probability distribution as a strategy. Formally, a strategy proﬁle
σ = (σ1, σ2, .., σn),where σi ∈ ∆Si,∀i is a mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium if
and only if;
ui(σi, σ−i) ≥ ui(s′i, σ−i) (7)
for each s′i ∈ Si and each player i.
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Theorem 1 (Nash,1950 [9]) In the n-player normalform game G, if n and
Si is ﬁnite for every i then there exists at least one Nash equilibrium possibly
involving mixed strategies.
2.3 Symmetric two-player games
A game G is a symmetric two-player game if S1 = S2 and u1(s2, s1) = u2(s1, s2)
for all (s1, s2) ∈ S1 × S2 = S
To classify symmetric 2×2 games we can use a graphical treatment. Consider
the payoﬀ matrix A.
A =
(
a11 a12
a21 a22
)
(8)
This is eqvivalent to:
A′ =
(
a11 − a12 0
0 a22 − a21
)
(9)
=
(
a1 0
0 a2
)
(10)
This eqvivalence relation holds because the Nash equilibria, both pure and
mixed, are the same after this normalization. It should be mentioned that
this eqvivalence only holds when we have a symmetric game. It follows that
any symmetric 2× 2 game after this normalization can be identiﬁed by a point
a = (a1, a2) ∈ R2
Let ∆NE be the set of Nash Equilibria. s1 refers to the ﬁrst row and the ﬁrst
column while s2 to the second row and the second column.
Category I: In this quadrant strategy 2 stricly dominates strategy 1(a1 <
0, a2 > 0). Hence all such games are stricly dominance solvable. ∆NE =
{
s2
}
Ex.Prisoners Dilemma.
Category II: All games in this category(a1 > 0, a2 > 0) have two symmet-
ric strict Nash equilibria, and one mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium. ∆NE ={
s1, s2, σ
}
. Ex. Coordination game.
Category III: No strategy is dominated(a1 < 0, a2 < 0), but the best reply
to a pure strategy is the other pure strategy. These games have two asymmet-
ric strict Nash Equilibria, and one symmetric mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium.
∆NE = {σ}. Ex. Hawk-Dove Game.
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Figure 1: Classiﬁcation of symmetric 2× 2 games
Category IV: The games in this category(a1 > 0, a2 < 0) are symmetric to
category I, but strategy 1 stricktly dominates strategy 2. ∆NE =
{
s1
}
In the later discussion games in category II and III will be used in exam-
ples since these games are analytically tractable. The other two categories can
be solved by using elimination of stricktly dominated strategies and are not
interresting within the framework this paper presents.
2.4 Risk dominant equilibrium
Consider the 2× 2 game G.
G =
a11, b11 a12, b12
a21, b21 a22, b22
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There are two pure strategy Nash Equilibria ∆NE =
{
s1, s2
}
if: a11 > a21, b11 >
b12, a22 > a12, b22 > b21. Again s
1 refers to the ﬁrst row and the ﬁrst column
while s2 to the second row and the second column.
The equilibrium (s1) is risk dominant if:
(a11 − a21)(b11 − b12) ≥ (a22 − a12)(b22 > b21) (11)
It is strictly risk dominant if equation (11) holds with strong inequality. (Harsanyi
and Selten,1988 [6]).
It is not always the case that players adapt to the Pareto-dominant equi-
librium when playing the game. The Pareto-dominant equilibrium is the one
yielding highest payoﬀ for the players. This comes from the tradeoﬀ between
eﬃcency and strategic risk. Eﬃciency here means that the players know which
payoﬀ that gives them the highest utility and when realizing this should play
such that this is achieved. The strategic risk stems from the possibility that the
other player(s) defects from the eﬃcient strategy and therefore inﬂict a loss to
the other player(s).
2.5 Evolutionary stability criteria
The ﬁrst step to explore evolutionary behavior in games formally was conducted
in the 1970's by Maynard Smith and Price(Maynard Smith and Price,1973 [8]).
The idea is that a large population is playing a game,G. Most of the individuals
are in a sense programmed to play the same strategy s ∈ S. While there is a
small group of mutants in the same population programmed to play some other
mutant strategy s′ ∈ S.
Formally, let us assume that the share of mutants is  ∈ (0, 1). Then pairs of
individuals are repeatedly drawn at random to play G(each with equal proba-
bility). Assume then that for the symmetic 2× 2 game, G, with payoﬀ matrix,
A =
(
a11 a12
a21 a22
)
(12)
a strategy s∗ is said to be evolutionary stable if it for all s 6= s∗ exists an  such
that:
sA(s+ (1− )s∗) < s∗A(s+ (1− )s∗) (13)
for all positive  < . (Maynard Smith and Price,1973 [8];Maynard Smith,1974 [7]).
Let ∆ESS be the set of evolutionary stable equlibrias, then:
∆ESS =
{
s ∈ ∆NE : u(s′, s′) < u(s, s′)} . (14)
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Where s, s′ ∈ S. This condition states that every evolutionary stable strategy
has to be a Nash equlibrium.
We can use the same kind of classiﬁcation scheme for 2 × 2 games as in
section 2.3 to show the evolutionary stable equilibrium(equilibria).
Category I: In this quadrant we have (a1 < 0 and a2 > 0). Hence in all such
games ∆NE =
{
s2
}
. The equilibrium is strict and symmetric so it have one
ESS. ∆ESS = ∆NE =
{
s2
}
Ex.Prisoners Dilemma.
Category II: All games in this category (a1 > 0, a2 > 0) have two symmetric
strict Nash equilibria, and one mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium. The two pure
strategy equlibrias are evolutionary stable. ∆ESS =
{
s1, s2
}
. Ex. Coordination
game.
Category III: These games have two asymmetric strict Nash Equilibria, and
one symmetric mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium (a1 < 0, a2 < 0). Therefore
∆ESS = {σ}. Ex. Hawk-Dove Game.
Category IV: The games in this category(a1 > 0, a2 < 0) are symmetric
to category I. ∆ESS = ∆NE =
{
s1
}
(For a more extensive representation of
evolutionary game theory see Weibull,1996 [10])
3 Markov Chain Theory
3.1 Introduction
A Markov process {Xt} is a stochastic process with the property that, given the
value of Xt, the values of Xs for s > t are not inﬂuenced by the values of Xu
for u < t. This discussion limits itself to stationary transition probabilities i.e
the probabilities are independent of time.
The Markov property is formally,
Pr(Xn+1 = j|X0 = i, ...,Xn = i) = Pr(Xn+1 = j|Xn = i) = Pij (15)
It is customary to arrange these probabilities,Pij , in a transition probability
matrix.
P =

P11 . . . . . . . . . P1n
...
. . .
...
... Pij
...
...
. . .
...
Pn1 . . . . . . . . . Pnn

(16)
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This matrix shows the probability of going from one state to the same or a
another state in one transition. For example Pij shows the probability of moving
from state i to state j.
Each transition probability satisﬁes the conditions:
Pij ≥ 0 ∀i, j = 1, .., n (17)
n∑
j=0
Pij = 1 i = 1, .., n (18)
The probability that the process goes from state i to state j in n transitions
are
P
(n)
ij = Pr(Xm+n = j|Xm = i) (19)
or eqvivalently, the n-step transition probabilities P
(n)
ij are the entries in the
matrix Pn.
3.2 One-Dimensional Movement in a Markov Chain
What is meant by an One-Dimensional Movement in a Markov Chain is that
when the process is in state i, it can in a single transition only stay in state i
or move to one of the neighboring states i-1 or i+1.
P =

s0 r0 0 . . . . . . . . . 0
l1 s1 r1 0 . . . . . . 0
0 l2 s2 r2 0 . . . 0
...
. . .
. . .
. . .
...
... ln−1 sn−1 rn−1
...
0 . . . . . . . . . . . . ln sn

(20)
where Pr(Xn+1 = i + 1|Xn = i) = ri, Pr(Xn+1 = i − 1|Xn = i) = li and
Pr(Xn+1 = i|Xn = i) = si, i = 0, ..., n.
These kind of processes will become important later when studying the adap-
tive play in games. It is often the case that the movement in the system is
one-dimensional and therefore follows such a Markov Chain.
3.3 Long-run Behavior of Markov Chains
We often want to know what happens with the stochastic process {Xt} when
we let time tend to inﬁnity i.e. the behavior of the entries in the transition
probability matrix Pn as n→∞. This gives us an idea of how likely it is that
the process will be in the diﬀerent states in the long-run.
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Before moving to the limiting behavior theory some concepts have to be
deﬁned.
Deﬁnition 8 If P
(n)
ij > 0 for some n ≥ 1, we say that j is accesible from i, or
in shorter notation (i→ j).
This means that there is positive probability that state j can be reached starting
from state i in some ﬁnite number of transitions.
Deﬁnition 9 Two states i and j, each accessible from the other is said to com-
municate (i↔ j).
Communicating states have three properties:
Reﬂexitivity,(i↔ i).
Symmetry, if (i↔ j) then (j ↔ i).
Transitivity, if (i↔ j) and (j ↔ k) then (i↔ k).
Deﬁnition 10 A set of states C is closed if Pij = 0, for i ∈ C and j /∈ C. No
state in C is accessible from any state outside C.
Deﬁnition 11 A subset C of S,where S is the whole state space, is irreducible
if all states in C communicates.
Deﬁnition 12 Periodicity of a Markov Chain The period d(i) of a state
i is the greatest common divisor of all numbers P
(n)
ii > 0 for all n ≥ 1. We
say that it is aperiodic if d(i) = 1. That is P 1ii > 0 or P
(n)
ii > 0, where n is a
prime number.
We can classiﬁy states by deciding whether they are recurrent or transient.
For this we need some notation.
f
(n)
ii = Pr(Xn = i,Xν 6= i, ν = 1, 2, ..., n− 1|X0 = i) (21)
f
(n)
ii is the probability of starting in state i, and then the process is in a state
i′ 6= i for n− 1 periods and at the nth period we return to state i.
Deﬁnition 13 Recurrent and transient states State i is recurrent if the
probability, fii, that we at some point in time return to state i is equal to 1. A
state i is transient if fii < 1.
Theorem 2 A state i is recurrent if and only if,
∞∑
n=1
P
(n)
ii =∞ (22)
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Equvivalently, state i is transient if and only if,
∞∑
n=1
P
(n)
ii <∞ (23)
(See Karlin and Taylor for a proof [2]). It is noteworthy that the deﬁniton and
the theorem states the same thing, but in diﬀerent ways.
Deﬁnition 14 Stationary distribution The distribution pi = (pi0, pi1, .., pin)
is stationary if pi = piP, where P is the transition probability matrix.
Deﬁnition 15 Positive recurrence If limn→∞ P
(n)
ii > 0 for one i in an ape-
riodic recurrent class, then pij > 0(pij is a stationary distribution) for all j in
the class of i. The class is then called positive reccurent.
Deﬁnition 16 Limiting distribution The distribution pi∗j = limn→∞ P
(n)
ij is
a limiting distribution if the limit exists, and it is independent of i and
∑
pi∗j = 1.
The next three thorems that are presented is crucial for determining if a
limit distribution exists, and they will be used implisitly in later chapters.
Theorem 3 A limit distribution is stationary.
Theorem 4 2 If the statespace S is ﬁnite, then:
1. Some state is recurrent.
2. All recurrent states are positive.
3. A stationary distribution always exist.
4. A limit distribution exists if the chain is irreducible and aperiodic.
Theorem 5 In a positive recurrent aperiodic Markov chain with states j=0,1,...
we have that,
lim
n→∞P
(n)
jj = pij =
∞∑
i=0
piiPij ,
∞∑
i=0
pii = 1 (24)
and the pi's are uniquely determined by the set of equations,
pii ≥ 0,
∞∑
i=0
pii = 1, pij =
∞∑
i=0
piiPij , j = 0, 1.. (25)
2In addition the following hold: A class is recurrent ⇔ the class is closed. A state is
transient if and only if for some closed set C, Pnij > 0 for some j ∈ C, some n and i /∈ C
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4 Stochastic Adaptive Dynamics
4.1 Introduction
In economics we often want to study how individual decitionmaking aﬀects the
economy at the aggregate level. The behavior of individuals are often illustrated
by assuming that they are rational and that they does not make any mistakes
when engaging each other in a strategic situation. In this section we leave
that assumption in a sense, and show how irrational behavior on the individual
level still can give rational behavior on the aggregate level. The reason that
causes this is that we let the behavior of individuals be aﬀected by (small)
persistent stochastic disturbances, which may alter the long-run behavior. In
this stochastic setting, conventional wisdom like evolutionary stable strategies
becomes obsolete. Instead of letting a small mutant group of players invade
the population we here assume that it is the stochastic disturbances and the
distribution of the population that is the factors determining the behavior and
therefore the equlibrium selection. The method used in this chapter leads to a
"new" equlibrium concept, namely stochastic stability, ﬁrst introduced by Young
and Foster(Foster and Young,1990 [1]). Much of this and the next chapter will
mainly contain theory but there will be presented some simple examples of how
this theory can be used.
This theory can be applied to many ﬁelds within economics. It can be
used for explaining bargaining problems like sharecropping in agriculture, the
existence of a pension system or the long-run behavior of ﬁrms in a duopoly. It is
especially suited for explaining conventions within a society. This was only a few
examples and there are many additional ﬁelds where we can use this theory(for
more examples see Bowles,2004 [12]). To gain further perspective, this theory
is also used in biology, where it is used to model a Darwinian strategic survival-
of-the-ﬁttest situation.
The stochastic disturbances may stem from diﬀerent sources. First, the
agents encounters with each other could happen at random. Second, the agents
behavior in the game may be intentionally random when using mixed strategies.
Third, there could be some kind of mutation process such that some agents do
mistakes in their course of action. Fourth, if agents are assumed to have memory
this can introduce uncertainty into the model.
In evolutionary game dynamics, when the population is large, random shocks
at the individual level will average out. This is just an implication of the law of
large numbers. This will induce that the process at the aggregate level will have
a deterministic direction of motion. This approach can be reasonable in the
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short- and medium-run, but it may fail when in the case of a long time horizon.
The most important insight when analysing the following processes is that
when the aggregate stochastic eﬀects are "small" the resulting Markov process
satisﬁes certain conditions. The conditions are that the process have a ﬁnite
state space, is irreducible and aperiodic. If fullﬁlled the process will have a
long-run distribution which is often concentrated on a single state when the
probability of making errors go to zero. This is the stochastically stable state
(or set if there are more states which occur with high probability). In many
cases we can say more about which equlibrium is selected when considering
stochastic stability versus Nash or evolutionary stable equlibria. When there are
two Nash equlibrias in a game we can not tell which of these will be played in
a real world situation, only that it is rational to play them. Using the concept
stochastic stability we can say more i.e we can predict the strategic behavior
of a population playing the game when the time horizon becomes long. The
stochastically stable equilibrium need not correspond to the Nash equlibrium or
the evolutionary stable equilibrium.
In this chapter there will be presented the analytical tools to ﬁnd the stochas-
tically stable state(s) in games. The games analysed here will be 2 × 2 games
for analytical conviniance. When a theorem or new concept is introduced there
will be examples to illustrate them.
4.2 The General Idea
Consider a population of size n playing the game G.
G =
a11, b11 a12, b12
a21, b21 a22, b22
At the beginning of each period one agent from the population is chosen
at random. Time is discrete. The state of the process at time t is the current
number of agents playing the ﬁrst row and the ﬁrst column, from now on referred
to as strategy A, denoted zt ∈ Z = {0, 1, ..., n}. Agents playing the second row
and the second column is reﬀered to as playing strategy B.
The best-response to the current distribution is given by the value of zt, that
is, whether it is smaller or bigger than the critical value,
zct =
a22 − a12
a11 − a12 + a22 − a21n (26)
Here it is assumed that the player includes himself in the assessment of the
current distribution.
With high probability, 1 − , the agent chooses a best-response to the cur-
rent distribution of strategies. With probability, /2, he chooses strategy A at
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random. Similarly he chooses strategy B with probability, /2. This leads to
what is called a perturbed Markov Process.
Example 1 Consider a population of n agents playing the Pareto Coordination
game.
2, 2 0, 0
0, 0 1, 1
The state of the process at time t is the current number of agents playing the
ﬁrst row or the ﬁrst column, from now on reﬀered to as strategy A and players
playing the second row or the second column is referred to as playing strategy
B, denoted zt ∈ Z = {0, 1, ..., n}. Time is discrete.
If zt ≥ n3 strategy A is a best-response.
If zt ≤ n3 strategy B is a best-response.
With high probability, 1 − , the agent chooses a best-response to the cur-
rent distribution of strategies. With probability, /2, he chooses strategy A at
random. Similarly he chooses strategy B with probability, /2. The process is
one-dimensional and the states can be illustrated as a directed tree. The only
movement we can have is either to stay in the same state or move one step to
the right or one step to the left.
Lets assume that n = 6. This imply that the critical value is 2.
Figure 2: 6-tree
The probabilities of the diﬀerent alternatives then becomes:
z < 2: Rz = (1−z/6)(/2), Lz = (z/6)(1−/2) and Sz = (1/6)(6−z+z−3)
z > 2: Rz = (1− z/6)(1− /2), Lz = (z/6)(/2) and Sz = (1/6)(z− z+ 3)
z = 2: R2 = 1/3, L2 = 1/6 and S2 = 1/2
The intuition behind the above transition probabilities are quite transparent.
If we are in a state z to the right of the critical point z = 2 the process moves
left if one less agent plays strategy A. This can happen if an agent currently
playing A is drawn(which happens with probability z/6) and this agent make a
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mistake and plays strategy B(which happens with probability /2). A symmetric
argument holds when considering right transitions. The probability of staying in
a state is of course one minus the probabilities of moving left and right. If we
are in the critical point it is assumed that  = 1 so the probability to play the
same or the new strategy are both one half. This leads to a perturbed Markov
chain,P. The entries in the matrix show the perturbed probabilities of moving
between the diﬀerent states. If we are in zt = 0, the probability of staying in
the same state is 1− /2 and the probability that the agent playing changes his
strategy(type) to strategy A is /2. The perturbed transition matrix is then,
P =

S0 R0 0 . . . . . . . . . 0
L1 S1 R1 0
...
0 L2 S2 R2 0
...
... 0 L3 S3 R3 0
...
... 0 L4 S4 R4 0
... 0 L5 S5 R6
0 . . . . . . . . . 0 L6 S6

(27)
which in this case is equal to,
P =

1− 2 2 0 . . . . . . . . . 0
(1−/2)
6
(5−2)
6
5
12 0
...
0 16
1
2
1
3 0
...
... 0 4
1
2
(1−/2)
2 0
...
... 0 3
(4−)
6
(1−/2)
3 0
... 0 512
(5−2)
6
(1−/2)
6
0 . . . . . . . . . 0 2 1− 2

(28)
4.3 Perturbed Markov Processes
Let P0 be a Markov process deﬁned on a ﬁnite state space S. A perturbation
of P0 is a process whose transition probabilities are slightly perturbed versions
of the transition probabilities P 0ij . An example of such a process is the matrix
P in Example 1 above.
Let P be a Markov process on S. P is a regular perturbed process if it is
irreducible for every  ∈ [0, ∗]. Formally,
lim
→0
P ij = P
0
ij (29)
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and if P ij > 0 for some  > 0, then
0 < lim
→0
P ij
r(i,j)
<∞ (30)
for some r(i, j) ≥ 0.
r(i, j) is the resistance of the transition from i to j, and is unique. Some
more explaining is needed on this. The resistance shows how diﬃcult it is to
move from one state to another in a perturbed process i.e how many 's that we
meet in the path in question. P 0ij > 0 if and only if r(i, j) = 0. This is because
transitions in the unperturbed process do not have any resistance. Next, assume
that r(i, j) =∞ if P ij = P 0ij = 0 for every .
Since the perturbed transition matrix P is irreducible and aperiodic for ev-
ery , it has an unique stationary distribution,pi. This distribution is important
when we want to ﬁnd the stochastically stable state. It is the case that when
we let  go to zero and the stationary probability of being in a speciﬁc state is
greater than zero this will be the stochastically stable state.
Theorem 6 (Young,1993a [4]) A state i is stochastically stable if,
lim
→0
pii > 0 (31)
Example 2 To illuminate Theorem 6 let us now consider for simplicity a pop-
ulation of 3 individuals playing the Pareto coordination game as above. The
critical point now becomes 1. The transition matrix then becomes,
P =

S0 R0 0 0
L1 S1 R1 0
0 L2 S2 R2
0 0 L3 S3
 =

1− 2 2 0 0
1
6
1
2
1
3 0
0 3
(2−/2)
3
(1−/2)
3
0 0 2 1− 2
 (32)
We then use standard Markov Chain theory if we want to ﬁnd the stationary
distribution. This process is irreducible because we can with positive probability
reach all states when we start in an arbitrary state i. It is also aperiodic since
Pii > 0 and therefore the greatest common divisor is of course 1. Because of
this we know that a limiting ditribution exists. The equality that has to hold is
pi = piP. This leads to the following equation system,
S0pi

0 + L1pi

1 = pi

0 (33)
R0pi

0 + S1pi

1 + L2pi

2 = pi

1 (34)
R1pi

1 + S2pi

2 + L3pi

3 = pi

2 (35)
R2pi

2 + S3pi

3 = pi

3 (36)
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pi0 + pi

1 + pi

2 + pi

3 = 1 (37)
The solution to the system is,
pi0 = ϕ, pi

1 = 3ϕ
2, pi2 = 3ϕ, pi

3 = ϕ(2− ), ϕ =
1
32 + 3+ 2
(38)
From this we clearly see that the only state that has lim→0 pii > 0, i = 0, 1, 2, 3,
is state 3,which is infact the stochastically stable state. In the long run all three
agents will be playing (A,A), which is the Pareto-eﬃcient solution of the game.
There are other methods to ﬁnd the stochastically stable state(s), as the
next theorem shows.
Theorem 7 (Young,1993a [4]) Let P be a regular perturbed Markov process,
and let pi be the unique stationary distribution of P for each  > 0. Then,
lim
→0
pi = pi0 (39)
exists, and pi0 is a stationary distribution of the unperturbed process,P0. The
stochastically stable states are precisely those states that are contained in the
reccurrent class(es) of P0 having minimum stochastic potential,denoted γi.
The concept minimum stochastic potential is explained in the next example.
Figure 3: Perturbed tree
Figure 4: Unperturbed tree( = 0)
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Example 3 In ﬁgure 4 we observe that the unperturbed process have two re-
current classes. C1 = {0} and C2 = {6}. In the pertubed process the path with
least resistance from C1 to C2 is:

2
5
12
(1− /2)
2
(1− /2)
3
(1− /2)
6
=
52(1− /2)3
2592
⇒ r12 = 2 (40)
Symmetrically the least resistant path from C2 to C1 is:

2
5
12

3

4
1
3
(1− /2)
6
=
54(1− /2)
5184
⇒ r21 = 4 (41)
Therefore the stochastic potential for the two reccurent classes are γ1 = 4 and
γ2 = 2.
Figure 5: Resistance between two recurrent classes
We conclude that C2 has the minimum stochastic potential and is therefore
the stochastically stable state.
The stochastic potential is the minimum of the resistances between diﬀerent
paths starting in state j and ending in a recurrent state(or set) of the system.
The above theorem states that the long-run probability of the process will
be concentrated around some state when we lack a estimate of , but know that
it is "small". If  was known we could in theory estmate it by computing the
actual distribution using the same method as above, namely ﬁnd the solution
to the equationsystem pi = piP.
In the discussion and examples so far it has been assumed for simplicity
that the population,n, has been small. If n becomes large, which is a resonable
assumption, the method of ﬁnding a perturbed stationary distribution becomes
very timeconsuming so another approach is more convinient to use. This is
called the Markov chain tree theorem.
4.4 Markov chain tree theorem
Let P be any irreducible Markov process deﬁned on a ﬁnite state space S. Take
one state i, and consider the directed tree Ti which consist of all right transitions
from states to the left of i and all left transitions from states to right of i. This
is called a i-tree. A directed tree is a graph that consists of S − 1 edges and
from every vertex j 6= i there exists an uniqe path from j to i. Figure 3 is an
example of a tree. (for more on graph theory see Wiitala,1987 [13]).
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Theorem 8 (Markov chain tree theorem [5]) For one-dimensional pro-
cesses, the long-run probability of being in state i is proportional to the product
of the probabilities on the edges of the directed tree Ti,
pii = k
∏
y<i
Ry
∏
y>i
Ly (42)
, here k is a factor of proportionality such that
∑n
i=0 pii = 1.
This theorem applied oﬀers a tractable way to calculate the probabilities for
being in diﬀerent states, and when applied it can be used to see which state(s)
is the stochastically stable one. One can just compare the diﬀerent probabilities
i.e to which power  the stationary distribution have in all the states and see
what happens as the perturbation tend to zero( → 0). Usually one state is
much more likely than the other states.
To check this theorem one can start out with the regular theory about sta-
tionary distributions in ﬁnite Markov chains, and insert in the above theorem.
Assume that the state is i. The subscipt i on the transition matrix,P, means
the i'th column of the matrix.
pii = piiPi
= Ri−1pii−1 + Sipii + Li+1pii+1
= Ri−1k
∏
y<i−1
Ry
∏
y>i−1
Ly + Sik
∏
y<i
Ry
∏
y>i
Ly
+ Li+1k
∏
y<i+1
Ry
∏
y>i+1
Ly
= Ri−1k
∏
y<i−1
Ry
∏
y>i−1
Ly + (1− Li −Ri)k
∏
y<i
Ry
∏
y>i
Ly
+ Li+1k
∏
y<i+1
Ry
∏
y>i+1
Ly
= k
∏
y<i
Ry
∏
y>i
Ly ≡ pii
(43)
This holds for every state i. In addition the condition that
∑
i pii = 1 must
hold. In this way we have shown that this approach is equvivalent to solving
the equation system pi = piP.
Example 4 cont. of Example 1. This example will show how the relative prob-
abilities diﬀer in which power the 's are, from this it is easy to ﬁnd the stochas-
tically stable state in the game in Example 1. The relative probabilities of the
six diﬀerent states are:
pi0 = k
∏
y<0
Ry
∏
y>0
Ly = kL1L2L3L4L5L6 = k
54(1− /2)
10368
(44)
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pi1 = k
∏
y<1
Ry
∏
y>1
Ly = kR0L2L3L4L5L6 = k
55
3456
(45)
pi2 = k
∏
y<2
Ry
∏
y>2
Ly = kR0R1L3L4L5L6 = k
56
6912
(46)
pi3 = k
∏
y<3
Ry
∏
y>3
Ly = kR0R1R2L4L5L6 = k
55
5184
(47)
pi4 = k
∏
y<4
Ry
∏
y>4
Ly = kR0R1R2R3L5L6 = k
54(1− /2)
3456
(48)
pi5 = k
∏
y<5
Ry
∏
y>5
Ly = kR0R1R2R3R4L6 = k
53(1− /2)2
864
(49)
pi6 = k
∏
y<6
Ry
∏
y>6
Ly = kR0R1R2R3R4R5 = k
52(1− /2)3
2592
(50)
When → 0 state 6 where all the players play strategy A is the most
probable state of the system, and therefore is the stochastically stable
state. The intuition behind this is that pi6 include 
2 while in the other states
epsilon is in a higher power than 2. Therefore as  → 0 the probabilities of
the other states will go much faster towards zero than the probability of state 6.
From this result we can draw the conclusion that this must be the stochastically
stable state. State 6 i.e all coordinate on playing (A,A) is also the Pareto-
optimal solution of the game. In this case the stochastically stable state is also a
Nash equilibrium in the game. This reﬁnement gives us more information about
what will happen when a population plays a game than standard game theory.
There are caveats in relation to the assumption about the long time horizon that
is needed to reach this equlibria, but this will be discussed in chapter 6.
4.5 A interesting example
Consider the Hawk-Dove game,G,
G =
w−l
2 ,
w−l
2 w, 0
0, w w2 ,
w
2
Here w is the reward of winning the ﬁght. The cost of losing is l. We assume
that there is an equal probability of winning if there are a ﬁght. In addition it
is assumed that w−l2 < 0. The ﬁrst row and the ﬁrst column is denoted strategy
ﬁght while the second row and the second column is denoted strategy ﬂight.
There is two asymmetric pure strategy Nash equilibria in this game, namely
(ﬁght,ﬂight) and (ﬂight,ﬁght). There is also one mixed strategy Nash equlibrium
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where the players play the ﬁght strategy with probability wl . This is also the
evolutionary stable equlibrium in this game.
Next assume that there are n agents in a population playing the game above.
The state of the system, at period t, is the number of agents playing the ﬁght-
strategy denoted by zt. There is also trembling of the same kind as in the
examples above. When deciding on which strategy to play the agents compare
the expected payoﬀ of the two strategies. The critical point is therefore, zt =
w
l n = δn, where δ ∈ (0, 1). So if zt > δn ⇒ fight is a best response, and if
zt < δn⇒ flight is a best response.
For illustrative purposes now assume that w = 4, l = 6 and that n = 15. The
critical point then becomes zt = 10. The transitions probabilities are of course,
z < 10: Rz = (1 − z/15)(/2), Lz = (z/15)(1 − /2) and Sz = 1 − Rz − Lz
z > 10: Rz = (1 − z/15)(1 − /2), Lz = (z/15)(/2) and Sz = 1 − Rz − Lz
z = 10: R10 = 1/3, L10 = 1/6 and S10 = 1/2
Using the Markov chain tree theorem we can ﬁnd the relative probabilities
of the diﬀerent states when t→∞.
pi0 = k
∏
y<0
Ry
∏
y>0
Ly = kL1 . . . L15 = k(/2)5(1− /2)9 (51)
pi15 = k
∏
y<15
Ry
∏
y>15
Ly = kR0 . . . R14 = k(/2)10(1− /2)4 (52)
Here the only two states we need to compare the probability of is the left- and the
right endpoint, since these are the possible candidates. From the calculation it
is clear that the probability that no one play ﬁght is the greatest, which imply
that the stochastically stable state(SSS) is (ﬂight,ﬂight). The probability of
this state is larger by a factor of 1/5 when comparing the two alternatives.
This diﬀers from the predictions of other equilibrium concepts. The long-run
aggregate behavior in the population is to "cooperate" such that the Pareto-
optimal equilibrium is played.
4.6 Link between Stochastic Stability
and Risk Dominance
There is a direct link between stochastic stability and risk dominance in 2 × 2
games. In this kind of game the stochastically stable state is the risk dominant
equilibrium. This was ﬁrst showed by Kandori, Mailath and Rob(1993) [11].
The conditions for this result to hold is that the mutation rate is uniform and
that the population is large enough. This eqvivalence relation can be illustrated
by using the results from Example 2.
20
Example 5 cont. of Example 2 The Pareto Coordination game is the following,
G =
a11, b11 a12, b12
a21, b21 a22, b22
with a11 = b11 = 2,a12 = b12 = a21 = b21 = 0 and a22 = b22 = 1. Using the the
method in chapter 2.4,
(a11 − a21)(b11 − b12) ≥ (a22 − a12)(b22 > b21) (53)
which in this case is the same as,
(2− 0)(2− 0) > (1− 0)(1− 0)⇒ 4 > 1 (54)
Therefore the equilibrium (A,A) is the stricktly risk dominant equilibrium, and
because of the eqvivalence relation also is the stochastically stable state as showed
in Example 2.
The eqvivalence between the two concepts holds only for 2 × 2 games. When
each player have more than two strategies in their strategy space this relation
breaks down.
4.7 Remarks
When trying to ﬁnd the stochastically stable state (or set) there are "many roads
that leads to Rome". When the diﬀerent methods should be used depends on
which situation one is in. Theorem 5 is not very usefull when the population
becomes large since this demands tedious calculations to ﬁnd the (perturbed)
stationary distribution of the system. Theorem 6 is easier to use when n in-
creases because it is often simple to ﬁnd the recurrent classes and after this to
ﬁnd the state with the minimum stochastic potential. The Markov chain tree
theorem is tractable when working with one-dimensional Markov chains, but be-
comes diﬃcult to use if we leave this assumption. Next there will be presented
an extension to the existing theory using a diﬀerent method. The Markov chain
tree theorem could possibly also be used, but that is omitted in this paper.
5 Extension of the Concept
5.1 Games with two populations playing agains each other
Consider the game G,
G =
a11, b11 a12, b12
a21, b21 a22, b22
21
Assume that there are m players in population A operating the rows, and that
there are n players in population B operating the columns. Let i be the number
of agents in population A that plays the ﬁrst row, denoted as strategy a, and
let j be the number of agents in population B that plays the ﬁrst column, also
denoted strategy a. The second row and the second column is both denoted
strategy b. Assume that time is discrete, and that in period t one player from
both populations is drawn at random. In addition the two agents drawn faces a
probability equal to 1/2 to be allowed to play i.e. in each period there is only one
of the drawn agents playing. The probability that the agent from population A
plays strategy a is pAa = i/m and that an agent from population B plays strategy
a is pBa = j/n. If the player from population A is allowed to play the agent
will choose strategy a if this yields a higher payoﬀ than playing strategy b. The
payoﬀs are determined as follows: The opponent is a randomly drawn player
from population B which play strategy a or strategy b with the probabilities
pBa = j/n and p
B
b = 1 − j/n respectively. The agent from population A then
compares the expected payoﬀs,
EA(a) = a11pBa + a12(1− pBa ) = a11(j/n) + a12(1− j/n) (55)
EA(b) = a21pBb + a22(1− pBb ) = a21(j/n) + a22(1− j/n) (56)
This gives a critical point for the agents behavior,
j∗ =
a22 − a12
a11 − a12 + a22 − a21n = δAn, δA ∈ (0, 1) (57)
This gives the following rule for playing the game: If j > j∗ = δAn ⇒play
strategy a, if j < j∗ = δAn ⇒play strategy b and if j = j∗ = δAn ⇒the agent
is indiﬀerent between strategy a and strategy b.
If the agent is a a-player and j < j∗ = δAn, the agent changes strategy to
being a b-player hence the state changes from (i/m) to ((i − 1)/m). On the
other hand if the player is a b-player and j > j∗ = δAn the state will change to
((i+1)/m). In the other cases we get no change in the state. Assume that there
is no change in j/n. In addition to this there is trembling. With probability
1 −  the agent follows a best-response scheme, with probability /2 the agent
goes left by mistake and with probability /2 the agent goes right by mistake.
Since we allow trembling the system will be similar to the cases in chapter 4,
but the diﬀerence here is that the states will be pairs (i, j) in the perturbed
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transition probability matrix.
P =

P(0,0)(0,0) . . . . . . . . . P(0,0)(m,n)
...
. . .
...
... P(i,j)(i,j)
...
...
. . .
...
P(m,n)(0,0) . . . . . . . . . P(m,n)(m,n)

(58)
If it is an agent from the B population playing it is naturally symmetric so,
i∗ =
b22 − b12
b11 − b12 + b22 − b21n = δBm, δB ∈ (0, 1) (59)
is the critical point and the behavior rules are, if i > i∗ = δBm⇒play strategy
a, if i < i∗ = δBm ⇒play strategy b and if i = i∗ = δBm ⇒the agent is
indiﬀerent between strategy a and strategy b.
The probabilities in the above transitions matrix,P can be calculated ex-
plicitly. If we are in a state (i, j), there are ﬁve possible transitions that can
happen. A agent from population A drawn with probability 1/2. The proba-
bilities of the transitions to the left or to the right will be aﬀected by the state
in population B, since the best-response dynamics for the population A player
is a aﬀected by the value of j. It will be symmetric for a agent from the B
population. If a agent from population A is drawn the transitions probabilities
are:
P(i,j)(i−1,j) =
1
2
(
i
m
)(1− 
2
), P(i,j)(i+1,j) =
1
2
(1− i
m
)(

2
), j < j∗
P(i,j)(i−1,j) =
1
2
(
i
m
)(

2
), P(i,j)(i+1,j) =
1
2
(1− i
m
)(1− 
2
), j > j∗
P(i,j)(i−1,j) =
1
4
(
i
m
), P(i,j)(i+1,j) =
1
4
(1− i
m
), j = j∗
, and symmetrically if a agent from population B are drawn:
P(i,j)(i,j−1) =
1
2
(
j
n
)(1− 
2
), P(i,j)(i,j+1) =
1
2
(1− j
n
)(

2
), i < i∗
P(i,j)(i,j−1) =
1
2
(
j
n
)(

2
), P(i,j)(i,j+1) =
1
2
(1− j
n
)(1− 
2
), i > i∗
P(i,j)(i,j−1) =
1
4
(
j
n
), P(i,j)(i,j+1) =
1
4
(1− j
n
), i = i∗
The probability of the transition to the same state is of course P(i,j)(i,j) =
1− P(i,j)(i−1,j) − P(i,j)(i+1,j) − P(i,j)(i,j−1) − P(i,j)(i,j+1).
Next, assume that the states (0, 0) and (m,n) are both recurrent and ab-
sorbing. Then any stationary distribution is a convex combination of pi0 which
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equals 1 for (0, 0) and 0 for all other states, and pi1 which equals 1 for (m,n) and
zero for all other states. Then if pi is the (unique) stationary distribution of P,
and pi is a cluster point of pi when  → 0, then pi is a stationary distribution
of the unperturbed process P0 and therefore equals a convex combination of pi0
and pi1. Let pi
k be a convergent sequence where k → 0 as k →∞ such that,
lim
k→∞
pik = pi (60)
For any γ > 0, pik(h, k′) < γ for all (h, k′) /∈ {(0, 0), (m,n)}. Moreover, pik(0,0) =
limq→∞ P
q
(h,k′)(0,0) for all (h, k
′), in particular for (h, k′) = (m,n) so
pik(0,0) = limq→∞ P
q
(m,n)(0,0) and symmetrically pi
k
(m,n) = limq→∞ P
q
(0,0)(m,n)
Figure 6: Illustration of the process
We know that j∗ is the critical value for population A. So if j > j∗ ⇒ play
strategy a and if j < j∗⇒play strategy b. Similarly i∗ is the critical value for
population B and if i > i∗⇒play strategy a or if i < i∗⇒play strategy b. When
considering the movement in the graph above these values become important,
and we can divide the behavior of the Markov process into four categories.
The movement in the process can be shown using a dynamic "best-response-
diagram".
I: j < j∗ and i < i∗ ⇒ strategy b is a best-response for both players since
(1/2)P(i,j)(i+1,j) < (1/2)P(i,j)(i−1,j) for the A population and (1/2)P(i,j)(i,j+1) <
(1/2)P(i,j)(i,j−1) for the B population i.e movement to the right is more likely
than movement to the left for both populations so the movement will be down-
ward and to the left.
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II: j < j∗ and i > i∗ ⇒ strategy b is a best-response for players in pop-
ulation A and strategy a is a best-response for players in population B since
(1/2)P(i,j)(i+1,j) < (1/2)P(i,j)(i−1,j) for the A population and (1/2)P(i,j)(i,j+1) >
(1/2)P(i,j)(i,j−1) for the B population i.e the movement of the process is upward
and to the left.
III: j > j∗ and i < i∗ ⇒ strategy a is a best-response for players in pop-
ulation A and strategy b is a best-response for players in population B since
(1/2)P(i,j)(i+1,j) > (1/2)P(i,j)(i−1,j) for the A population and (1/2)P(i,j)(i,j+1) <
(1/2)P(i,j)(i,j−1) for the B population i.e the movement of the process is down-
ward and to the right.
IV: j > j∗ and i > i∗ ⇒ strategy a is a best-response for both players since
(1/2)P(i,j)(i+1,j) > (1/2)P(i,j)(i−1,j) for the A population and (1/2)P(i,j)(i,j+1) >
(1/2)P(i,j)(i,j−1) for the B population i.e movement to the right is more likely
than movement to the left for both populations so the movement will be upward
and to the right.
Figure 7: Law-of-motion in the process
We will show the order of magnitudes,with respect to , of the various proba-
bilities. To calculate order of magnitudes, we can replace probabilities connected
with "nontrembling" by one i.e the cases where we have 1− /2 ≈ 1. We use ∼
when order of magnitude is described. From the ﬁgure we see that P i
∗+j∗
(i∗,j∗)(0,0) ∼
1. This means that moving from the point (i∗, j∗) to (0, 0) in the process hap-
pens without meeting resistance since the movement of the process goes in this
direction,when assuming that this is a directed path from (i∗, j∗) to (0, 0). The
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reason why the probability has i∗+j∗ as power is that it will take i∗+j∗ steps to
reach from (0, 0) from (i∗, j∗) and vice versa. When we go from (0, 0) to (i∗, j∗)
there will be resistance since we are going uphill against the movement of the
process. The probability of this is P i
∗+j∗
(0,0)(i∗,j∗) ∼ min{i
∗+1,j∗+1}. If we con-
sider the other recurrent state ,(m,n), the probability of moving from (i∗, j∗) to
(m,n) is Pm−i
∗+n−j∗
(i∗,j∗)(m,n) ∼ 1 and the probability of moving from (m,n) to (i∗, j∗) is
equal to Pm−i
∗+n−j∗
(m,n)(i∗,j∗) ∼ min{m−i
∗,n−j∗}. Therefore the probabilities of moving
from one recurrent state to the other is:
Pm+n(m,n)(0,0) ∼ min{m−i
∗,n−j∗} (61)
Pm+n(0,0)(m,n) ∼ min{i
∗+1,j∗+1} (62)
These probabilities are proportional and by introducing a proportionality vari-
able we can ﬁnd the probabilities more exact. The next to last step before
ending in the recurrent state (m,n) or (0, 0) can originate from three diﬀer-
ent positions namely (m− 1, n), (m,n− 1) and (m,n) or (1, 0), (0, 1) and (0, 0)
respectively. We can therefore make the proportionality variable a convex com-
bination of these three possibilities. Let α(0,0) be the variable corresponding to
the path from (m,n) to (0, 0) and let β(m,n) correspond to the path (0, 0) to
(m,n). Then the probabilities becomes:
Pm+n(m,n)(0,0) = α(0,0)
min{m−i∗,n−j∗} (63)
Pm+n(0,0)(m,n) = β(m,n)
min{i∗+1,j∗+1} (64)
Here α(0,0) = kco
{{
α(0,0), α(1,0), α(0,1)
}}
and β(m,n)=
kco
{{
β(m,n), β(m−1,n), β(m,n−1)
}}
. k is a factor which is the same for both
α(0,0) and β(m,n) and stems from the number of addends in P
m+n. k ∈ [1, 3).
Here it is assumed that when the state is exactly in i∗ the downward move-
ment in the third quadrant is in eﬀect and likevise when the state is exactly in
j∗ the dominant eﬀect is the left movement in the second quadrant. This is the
case when we me move from (m,n) to (0, 0). When we have the opposite path,
namely from (0, 0) to (m,n), we say that the upward movement in the second
quadrant kicks in at i∗ + 1 and that the right movement in the third quadrant
is in eﬀect at j∗ + 1.
The explaination of why the probabilities is propotional to min{i
∗+1,j∗+1} or
min{m−i
∗,n−j∗} is that this must be the paths of least resistance. Within this
framework resistance means how diﬃcult it is to move against the motion of the
process i.e how many 's one encounter when going from one state to another.
The intuition is that when starting at (0, 0) the movement up and to the right
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meets more resistance when we move along an arbitrary path to (i∗ + 1, j∗ + 1)
than if we follow the most eﬃcient of the two possible paths. There are two
paths that potentially can have the least resistance moving from (0, 0) to (m,n).
The ﬁrst of these paths goes from (0, 0) to (i∗ + 1, 0) which causes i∗ + 1 steps
that meets resistance and when we get to (i∗+1, 0) the movement of the system
is upward and this imply no resistance to reach (i∗+ 1, j∗+ 1). From this point
the movment is upward and to the right so we can go from (i∗ + 1, j∗ + 1)
to (m,n) meeting no more resistance. The other path ﬁrst go from (0, 0) to
(0, j∗ + 1) meeting j∗ + 1 steps with resistence and then the right movment in
the third quadrant gives no resistance to reach (i∗ + 1, j∗ + 1) and also here
there are no more resistance from (i∗ + 1, j∗ + 1) to (m,n) as above. Taking
the minimum of these two paths gives the path from (0, 0) to (m,n) that meets
the least resistance and is therefore the most eﬃcient path. When we start
at (m,n) the two paths that are candidates for being the one with the least
resistance. The ﬁrst is the path (m,n) to (m− i∗, n),with m− i∗ steps meeting
resistance, and then move downwards to (m− i∗, n− j∗) without resistance in
the third quadrant. When in the point (m−i∗, n−j∗) the process meets no more
resistance on its way down to (0, 0). The second path is (m,n) to (m,n − j∗),
with n− j∗ steps meeting resistance, and then move without resistance down to
(0, 0) from (m,n − j∗). We use the minimum function in both cases to decide
which of the two paths are the one with the least resistance.
By induction, assume that for all m,n and any given q ≥ m+ n the proba-
bilities are proportional to,
P q
′
(m,n)(0,0) ∼ min{m−i
∗,n−j∗} (65)
P q
′
(0,0)(m,n) ∼ min{i
∗+1,j∗+1} (66)
and q ≥ q′ ≥ m+ n.
Or,
P q
′
(m,n)(0,0) = α(q′,0,0)
min{m−i∗,n−j∗} (67)
P q
′
(0,0)(m,n) = β(q′,m,n)
min{i∗+1,j∗+1} (68)
Like above α(q′,0,0) = kco
{{
α(q′,0,0), α(q′,1,0), α(q′,0,1)
}}
and β(q′,m,n)=
kco
{{
β(q′,m,n), β(q′,m−1,n), β(q′,m,n−1)
}}
. k is a factor which is the same for
both α(q′,0,0) and β(q′,m,n) and stems from the number of addends in P
q′ . k ∈
[1, 3).
In the next induction argument these variables are omitted for convinence
since they wont aﬀect the result.
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Let us show this formula for q′+1. For any path from (0, 0) to (m,n) or (m,n)
to (0, 0), if at step q′ the state is in (m,n) or (0, 0) respectively there is nothing
to prove since P q
′+1
(0,0)(m,n) ∼ min{i
∗+1,j∗+1} and P q
′+1
(m,n)(0,0) ∼ min{m−i
∗,n−j∗}.
If the next to last state is either (m − 1, n) or (m,n − 1) the products up
to step q′ are, respectively, P q
′
(0,0)(m−1,n) ∼ P q
′+1
(0,0)(m,n) ∼ min{i
∗+1,j∗+1} and
P q
′
(0,0)(m,n−1) ∼ P q
′+1
(0,0)(m,n) ∼ min{i
∗+1,j∗+1}, since there is no resistance for
this movement(the last step has a probability ∼ 1). But for the reversed
path there will be alterations, here the probabilities will be,P q
′
(m−1,n)(0,0) ∼
min{m−1−i
∗,n−j∗} ⇒ P q′+1(m,n)(0,0) ∼ min{m−1−i
∗,n−j∗} and
P q
′
(m,n−1)(0,0) ∼ min{m−i
∗,n−1−j∗} ⇒ P q′+1(m,n)(0,0) ∼ min{m−i
∗,n−1−j∗}. This is
because the last step imply one more unit of resistance i.e one more . This
holds if we require that the path should go from (m,n) to (0, 0) in q′ + 1 steps.
It will be totally symmetric when at step q′ we are in state (1, 0) or (0, 1) and
require that we go from state (0, 0) to (m,n) in q′ + 1 steps.
To decide which of these paths has the least resistance we have to compare
the transition probabilities. We now consider the case when we at step q′ are
in state (m− 1, n) or (m,n− 1). If, P q′(m−1,n)(0,0) ∼ min{m−1−i
∗,n−j∗} <
min{m−i
∗,n−1−j∗} ∼ P q′(m,n−1)(0,0) then, min {m− 1− i∗, n− j∗} <
min {m− i∗, n− 1− j∗}. Here m− 1− i∗ is clearly less than m− i∗, and n− j∗
is bigger than n− 1− j∗ so we have to compare m− 1− i∗ and n− 1− j∗. This
gives, m − 1 − i∗ < n − 1 − j∗ ⇒ m − i∗ < n − j∗. So if m − i∗ < n − j∗ the
best path is to the left from (m,n) to (0, 0).
Lets check if this holds for q′+1, P q
′+1
(m,n)(0,0) ∼ min{m−1−i
∗,n−j∗} = m−1−i
∗
=
m−i
∗
= min{m−i
∗,n−j∗}. When the opposite inequality holds we get, P q
′+1
(m,n)(0,0) ∼
min{m−i
∗,n−1−j∗} = min{m−i
∗,n−1−j∗} = n−1−j
∗
= n−j
∗
= min{m−i
∗,n−j∗}.
Again we have that because of symmetry this holds for the paths from (1, 0)
and (0, 1) to (m,n).
The induction argument above shows that the transition probabilities are
only aﬀected by the value of q in the variables α(q,0,0) and β(q,m,n). If we assume
that these are bounded i.e 0 < limq→∞ α(q,0,0) < ∞, limq→∞ α(q,0,0) = α and
0 < limq→∞ β(q,m,n) <∞, limq→∞ β(q,m,n) = β, we can say the following,
pik(0,0) = limq→∞α(q,0,0)P
q
(m,n)(0,0) = α
min{m−i∗,n−j∗} (69)
and,
pik(m,n) = limq→∞β(q,m,n)P
q
(0,0)(m,n) = β
min{i∗+1,j∗+1} (70)
So lim→0 αpik(0,0)  lim→0 βpik(m,n) if, min{m−i
∗,n−j∗} < min{i
∗+1,j∗+1} which
imply the following conditions for (0, 0) to be the equilibrium, m− i∗ < i∗+1⇔
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m < 2i∗+1, n−j∗ < j∗+1⇔ n < 2j∗+1, m−i∗ < j∗+1⇔m < i∗+j∗+1 and
n− j∗ < i∗ + 1 ⇔ n < i∗ + j∗ + 1. If we have lim→0 αpik(0,0) ≺ lim→0 βpik(m,n)
the conditions is symmetric. So the equilibrium is given from the size of the
populations and the distribution of payoﬀs in the game.
Example 6 Consider the Hawk-Dove game as in section 4.5, with w = 4 and
l = 6. The payoﬀs in the game then becomes,
−1,−1 4, 0
0, 4 2, 2
We now want to check which predictions the new concept gives in this game.
Calculating the critical points in each population is done as above and yields,
j∗ = 23n and symmetrically i
∗ = 23m. Now assume that the A and B popu-
lations are of diﬀerent sizes, say n = 9 and m = 6, which imply j∗ = 6 and
i∗ = 4. The probability of moving from one recurrent state to the other is:
P 15(0,0)(6,9) ∼ min{m−i
∗,n−j∗} = min{2,3} = 2 and P 15(6,9)(0,0) ∼ min{i
∗+1,j∗+1} =
min{5,7} = 5. Using this result we can ﬁnd the limiting distributions: pik(0,0) =
limq→∞ α(q,0,0)P
q
(6,9)(0,0) = α
min{m−i∗,n−j∗} = α2 and pik(6,9) =
limq→∞ β(q,6,9))P
q
(0,0)(6,9) = β
min{i∗+1,j∗+1} = β5. To ﬁnd the stochastically
stable state we have to compare how the two limiting distributions evolves when
 → 0, which is: lim→0 pik(0,0) = lim→0 α2 and lim→0 pik(6,9) = lim→0 β5.
Since the long-run probability of state (0, 0) involves  to the power of 2 while
the probability for state (6, 9) involves  to the power of 5 it should be obvious
that, as  → 0, the state (0, 0) is much more likely than state (6, 9). Therefore
state (0, 0) is the stochastically stable state i.e all the agents in population A and
population B plays the second row and the second column respectively. This equi-
librium strategy is ﬂight. This corresponds to the predicted stochastically stable
state in section 4.5, but now the only diﬀerence is that we have two populations
playing against each other in contrast to the single population earlier.
6 Discussion of the assumptions underlying the
theory
An economy is a extremly complex system and to be able to investigate the
diﬀerent aspects it is crucial to make simplifying assumption. In this section we
have a closer look at the assumptions of the models and methods used in this
paper.
First, when we want to ﬁnd the stochastically stable state (set) we let the
number of time periods tend to inﬁnity. Therefore it takes a very long time
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before the system reaches the equilibrium and we can not say anything about
the strategic interaction in the short and medium-run. So stochastic stability is
a concept only to be used when the time period we are interested in are long.
Many will be tempted to say that this makes the concept unusable because of
the known fact that "in the long-run, we're all dead", but if the time periods are
measured in short intervals i.e the strategic interactions happens very frequently,
we can probably reach the stochastically stable state in a shorter time horizon.
Second, the trembling in the models is assumed to be stationary since  is a
given small number. This means that all agents in the population(s) are equaly
likely to make an error, so the population is homogenous in this respect. In
a real world population this is clearly not the case, but if the probability of
making an error was to be diﬀerent for each agent(it could have been normally
distributed) it would make the model more complex and therefore is omitted
here.
Third, in the above models we have not said anything about the exact value
of , only that it is a small number. It is a resonable assumption that the
probability of making errors are small, but if  increases for some reason this
may alter the behavior of the agents (See Young,1998 [4] or Young,2009 [5]).
Fourth, here it has been the case that the players have made their decitions
on the basis of the number of agents in the population playing the diﬀerent
strategies. This can be a reasonable assumption if it is possible to do so. In the
litterature there exist other factors that the agents base their decitions on, for
example letting the agents have memory. In this kind of models the agent draw
a memory combinaton,of what happened in the m last periods, and base their
decition on this(See Young,1998 [4]).
7 Conclusion
The aim of this paper have been to present and reﬁne the theory of stochastic
stability in normal-form games. The existing theory is here stated without
proofs, but references to the litterature is given. When the theorems have been
presented there are examples to make the theory more applicable to economic
problems. The new extension give an alternative way to ﬁnd the stochastically
stable state(s) in games with two populations. The results from this theory
gives reasonable predictions when compared with the one population case.
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